**** PROGRAM FILE FOR "INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL BARGAINING STRUCTURES" PROJECT: REPORTED MODELS' RESULTS **** 

 
* OPEN STATA OUTPUT FILE LOG *

log using "C:\Users\gk57526\Dropbox\Informal & Formal Bargaining (BAA Reforms)\JOP Replication File Materials\Output\execbudinfluence.08-26-2020.SI SECTION 5.ALTERNATIVE AGENCY PANEL MODELS.comments.smcl" 




 
*** SECTION 5 OF SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT: SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR ALTERNATIVE AGENCY PANELS ***

   
   
*** 5A. OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED ONE-SIDED AGENCIES ***

*** 5B. OMIT ALL ONE-SIDED AGENCIES [EITHER TERMINATED PRE-BAA REFORMS OR CREATED POST-BAA REFORMS] ***

*** 5C. INCLUSION OF AGENCY UNIT-EFFECTS FOR AGENCY PANELS THAT SUFFICIENTLY STRADDLE PRE-BAA AND POST-BAA REFORM REGIMES & HAVE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS *** 
   
   
   


 * OPEN "EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE" DATABASE WITH NEWLY CREATED VARIABLES
 
use "C:\Users\gk57526\Dropbox\Informal & Formal Bargaining (BAA Reforms)\JOP Replication File Materials\Data\execbudinfluence.08-26-2020.REPORTED MODELS.REV.comments.dta", replace

 

*** DECLARE DATABASE AS A PANEL (AGENCY ID * FISCAL YEAR): 

xtset agenid fyear, yearly

*
*
*


*********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** STEP 1. GENERATE POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCY INDICATOR [= 1 FOR AGENCIES CREATED POST-BAA; = 0 OTHERWISE (FOR AGENCIES CREATED PRE-BAA) ***

gen postbaaagencies=1 if agenid==3 | agenid==5 | agenid==7 | agenid==16 | agenid==18 | agenid==25 | agenid==26 | agenid==28 | agenid==29 | agenid==30 |agenid==32 
replace postbaaagencies = 0 if postbaaagencies==.


*** STEP 2. GENERATE ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE/POST-BAA AGENCY INDICATOR [= 1 FOR AGENCIES CREATED POST-BAA FYs OR TERMINATED PRE-BAA; = 0 OTHERWISE (FOR AGENCIES CONTAINING BOTH PRE & POST BAA OBSERVATIONS) ***

gen onesidedagencies=1 if agenid==8 | agenid==11 | agenid==13 | agenid==37 | agenid==3 | agenid==5 | agenid==7 | agenid==16 | agenid==18 | agenid==25 |agenid==26 | agenid==28 | agenid==29 | agenid== 30 | agenid==32
replace onesidedagencies = 0 if onesidedagencies==.



*** STEP 3. GENERATE AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS AND EMPLOY THOSE THAT SUFFICIENTLY STRADDLE BOTH PRE-REFORM & POST-REFORM ERAS ***

tabulate agenid, gen(agenid)
*
*
quietly movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa  bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
if agenid!=15, select(regimereg = executiveagency)
*
tabulate agenid if bureauofbudget==0 & e(sample)
*
tabulate agenid if bureauofbudget==0 & e(sample)


*** AGENCIES WITH SUFFICIENT STRADDLE TO HAVE THEIR OWN UNIT EFFECTS: AGENID==9 [AGRICULTURE], AGENID==12 [JUSTICE], ///
*** AGENID==22 [INTERIOR], AGENID==23 [ICC*], AGENID==27 [POST OFFICE*], AGENID==31 [SMITHSONIAN*], AGENID==33 [STATE], AGENID==35 [TREASURY] 
*   NOTE: INDEPENDENT OFFICES DENOTED WITH ASTERISK *




*********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************





******* PROPOSITION 1: DID BAA REFORMS/CENTRALIZATION IMPROVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE VETO THREAT [AVET LOGIC OF KIEWIET AND MCCUBBINS 1988, 1991]? ************

** POSIT THAT E <= A: REGIMEREG, REGIMETOT = 1 (I.E., FAVORABLE EXECUTIVE BARGAINING POSITION) IS MORE PREVALENT IN POST-BAA ERA COMPARED TO PRE-BAA ERA **
** POSIT THAT E > A : REGIMEREG, REGIMETOT = 0 (I.E., UNFAVORABLE EXECUTIVE BARGAINING POSITION) IS LESS PREVALENT IN POST-BAA ERA COMPARED TO PRE-BAA ERA **


************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** TABLE SI-5A -- SENSITIVITY TESTS WITH REDUCED EFFECTIVE SAMPLES ****



*** 5A. FULL SAMPLE VERSUS OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE VERSUS OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED & POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE ****
 

 
*** 5A.1. FIRST, OBTAIN CORRECT MATCHED EFFECTIVE SAMPLE [T * N = 676] BASED ON ERS REGRESSION MODELS EMPLOYED IN THIS STUDY ***

quietly movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa  bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
if agenid!=15, select(regimereg = executiveagency)


*** 5A.2. DIFFERENCE IN PROPORTIONS TEST INVOLVING PROPORTION OF CREDIBLE VETO THREAT EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSALS [E <= A] IN PRE-BAA VERSUS POST-BAA ERAS [REGULAR & TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGETS] ***


*** TABLE SI-5A: FULL SAMPLE/REGULAR BUDGET: 'AUSTERE' EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL PROPORTION DIFFERENCE [SECTION 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT]
prtest regimereg if e(sample), by(bureauofbudget)
*
*

*** TABLE SI-5A: FULL SAMPLE/TOTAL BUDGET: 'AUSTERE' EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL PROPORTION DIFFERENCE [SECTION 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT]
prtest regimetot if e(sample), by(bureauofbudget)



*** TABLE SI-5A: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES/REGULAR BUDGET: 'AUSTERE' EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL PROPORTION DIFFERENCE [SECTION 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT]
prtest regimereg if e(sample) & postbaaagencies==0, by(bureauofbudget)
*
*

*** TABLE SI-5A: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES/TOTAL BUDGET: 'AUSTERE' EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL PROPORTION DIFFERENCE [SECTION 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT]
prtest regimetot if e(sample) & postbaaagencies==0, by(bureauofbudget)
*
*

*** TABLE SI-5A: OMIT PRE-BAA TERMINATED & POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES/REGULAR BUDGET: 'AUSTERE' EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL PROPORTION DIFFERENCE [SECTION 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT]
prtest regimereg if e(sample) & onesidedagencies==0, by(bureauofbudget)
*

**** TABLE SI-5A: OMIT PRE-BAA TERMINATED & POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES/TOTAL BUDGET: 'AUSTERE' EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSAL PROPORTION DIFFERENCE [SECTION 5: SUPPORTING INFORMATION DOCUMENT]
prtest regimetot if e(sample) & onesidedagencies==0, by(bureauofbudget)
*
*



*********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************






******* PROPOSITION 2: DOES A STRONGER EXECUTIVE VETO THREAT [VIA BAA REFORMS] TRANSLATE INTO GREATER EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE UNDER A WEAK VETO THREAT? ************


** POSIT THAT EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE HAS DECLINED [IMPROVED] IN POST-BAA ERA COMPARED TO PRE-BAA ERA FOR CREDIBLE (NON-CREDIBLE) VETO THREAT BUDGET PROPOSALS [E <= A] ([E > A]) **





*** A. OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE [POSTBAAAGENCIES==0] ****
 


*** A1. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***

** NOTE: MUST EXCLUDE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION FIXED EFFECTS IN THE ANALYSIS BELOW TO OBTAIN MODEL CONVERGENCE ***


movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2 execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
if postbaaagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) /// 
select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*
*

** TABLE SI-5B: REGULAR BUDGET MODEL: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES  [SECTION 5: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] -- ANALOGOUS TO FIGURE 2 COMPUTED STATISTICS IN 'MANUSCRIPT MODELS' PROGRAM & OUTPUT **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa - [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 




***************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** A2. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION) ***

movestay congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 ebctot2baa bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
if postbaaagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid)  /// 
select(regimetot = executiveagency)  difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

** TABLE SI-5B: TOTAL BUDGET MODEL: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES [SECTION 5: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] -- ANALOGOUS TO FIGURE 2 COMPUTED STATISTICS IN 'MANUSCRIPT MODELS' PROGRAM & OUTPUT **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa - [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 




************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
***************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************





*** B. OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE [ONESIDEDAGENCIES==0] ****
 


*** B1. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***

** CANNOT OBTAIN MODEL CONVERGENCE **
 
*movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2 execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
*if onesidedagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid)  ///
*select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
*estat ic
*
*
*

***************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************




*** B2. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***

movestay congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 ebctot2baa bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
if onesidedagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

** TABLE SI-5B: TOTAL BUDGET MODEL: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED & POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE  [SECTION 5: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] -- ANALOGOUS TO FIGURE 2 COMPUTED STATISTICS IN 'MANUSCRIPT MODELS' PROGRAM & OUTPUT **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa - [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 




************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** C. GENERATE AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS AND EMPLOY THOSE THAT SUFFICIENTLY STRADDLE BOTH PRE-REFORM & POST-REFORM ERAS ***




*** C1. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***


movestay congbudchangereg2  l1congbudchangereg2 execbudchangereg2 ebcreg2baa bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
agenid9 agenid12 agenid22 agenid23 agenid27 agenid31 agenid33 agenid35 if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

** TABLE SI-5B: REGULAR BUDGET MODEL: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS BASED ON 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS  [SECTION 5: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] -- ANALOGOUS TO FIGURE 2 COMPUTED STATISTICS IN 'MANUSCRIPT MODELS' PROGRAM & OUTPUT **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa - [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 



************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** C2. BASELINE MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ///
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***

movestay congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 ebctot2baa bureauofbudget lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear ///
agenid9 agenid12 agenid22 agenid23 agenid27 agenid31 agenid33 agenid35 if agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

** TABLE SI-5B: TOTAL BUDGET MODEL: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS BASED ON 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS  [SECTION 5: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL] -- ANALOGOUS TO FIGURE 2 COMPUTED STATISTICS IN 'MANUSCRIPT MODELS' PROGRAM & OUTPUT **

* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1: E <= A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
*
* MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 0: E > A)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa
*
*
*
* PARTIAL DIFFERENTIAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS (REGIME 1 VS. REGIME 0)
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa - [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 




************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************


  
  
  
 ******* PROPOSITION 3: DOES CENTRALIZATION [VIA BAA REFORMS] REDUCE THE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE OF AGENCY HEADS? **********

 

 
 
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************




*** A. OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE [POSTBAAAGENCIES==0] ****
 


*** A1. AUGMENTED AGENCY HEAD MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ***
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***
*** LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] *** FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***


movestay (congbudchangereg2 l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 bureauofbudget ebcreg2baa lnagencyheadtenure baalnaht  ebcreg2lnaht  ebcreg2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage  unifiedpartygovt presadminyear) if postbaaagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) ///
select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5: REGULAR BUDGET MODEL: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE] **



*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY AHT = 1, 6, & 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ARE REPORTED BELOW TO MATCH THE ENTRIES IN TABLE SI-5C ****



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.1A: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.2A: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907
*
*
*
***************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************


*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.1B: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.2B: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907 
*
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************


*** A2. AUGMENTED TENURE DIFFERENTIAL MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ///
***     ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ***
***     [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***
***     LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] *** FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***

movestay (congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 bureauofbudget ebctot2baa lnagencyheadtenure  baalnaht  ebctot2lnaht  ebctot2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear) if postbaaagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*


********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE] **

*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY AHT = 1, 6, & 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ARE REPORTED BELOW TO MATCH THE ENTRIES IN TABLE SI-5C ****




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.1A: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.2A: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************


*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.1B: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***


* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.2B: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907 



************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************





*** B. OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE [ONESIDEDAGENCIES==0] ****
 
 
 

*** B1. AUGMENTED AGENCY HEAD MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ***
*** [SELECTIVITY INSTRUMENTS: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION); [PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION YEAR]] ***
*** LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] *** FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***


movestay (congbudchangereg2 l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 bureauofbudget ebcreg2baa lnagencyheadtenure ///
baalnaht  ebcreg2lnaht  ebcreg2baalnaht  lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear) ///
if onesidedagencies==0 & agenid!=15, cluster(agenid) select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE] **

*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY AHT = 1, 6, & 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ARE REPORTED BELOW TO MATCH THE ENTRIES IN TABLE SI-5C ****




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.1A: PRE-BAA REFORMS -- OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.2A: POST-BAA REFORMS -- OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907

*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.1B: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.2B: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907 
*
*
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** B2. AUGMENTED TENURE DIFFERENTIAL MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ***
*** [SELECTIVITY INSTRUMENTS: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION); [PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION YEAR]] ***
*** LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] *** FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***
*** LINEAR INTERACTION EFFECT IN AGENCY HEAD COVARIATE: CONTINUOUS AGENCY HEAD COVARIATE ***

movestay (congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 bureauofbudget ebctot2baa lnagencyheadtenure  baalnaht  ebctot2lnaht  ebctot2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt  presadminyear) if onesidedagencies==0 & agenid!=15, ///
cluster(agenid) select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE] **

*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY AHT = 1, 6, & 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ARE REPORTED BELOW TO MATCH THE ENTRIES IN TABLE SI-5C ****



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.1A: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.2A: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907

*
*
*
*
*
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************


*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.1B: PRE-BAA REFORMS: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***


* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.2B: POST-BAA REFORMS: OMIT ALL "ONE-SIDED" PRE-BAA TERMINATED AND POST-BAA REFORM CREATED AGENCIES IN SAMPLE -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907 




************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************

 

*** C. GENERATE AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS AND EMPLOY THOSE THAT SUFFICIENTLY STRADDLE BOTH PRE-REFORM & POST-REFORM ERAS [PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS] ***




*** C1. AUGMENTED AGENCY HEAD MODEL SPECIFICATION, I -- REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [EXCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ***
*** [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***
*** LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] *** FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***


movestay (congbudchangereg2 l1congbudchangereg2  execbudchangereg2 bureauofbudget ebcreg2baa lnagencyheadtenure baalnaht  ebcreg2lnaht  ebcreg2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage  unifiedpartygovt presadminyear agenid9 agenid12 agenid22 agenid23 agenid27 agenid31 agenid33 agenid35) if agenid!=15, ///
cluster(agenid) select(regimereg = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5: REGULAR DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS] **

*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY AHT = 1, 6, & 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ARE REPORTED BELOW TO MATCH THE ENTRIES IN TABLE SI-5C ****



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.1A: PRE-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.2A: POST-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_1]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangereg2_1]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.1B: PRE-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART I.2B: POST-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangereg2_0]execbudchangereg2 + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baa + [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangereg2_0]ebcreg2baalnaht*2.484907 
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************
************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************




*** C2. AUGMENTED TENURE DIFFERENTIAL MODEL SPECIFICATION, II -- TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET [INCLUDES EXTRAMURAL FUNDS]: ///
***     ENDOGENOUS REGIME SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS ESTIMATED BY FIML ***
***     [SELECTIVITY COVARIATE: AGENCY DESIGN (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT / INDEPENDENT AGENCY BINARY DISTINCTION)] ***
***     LN [AGENCY HEAD TENURE [AHT]] *** FULL SAMPLE OF AHT OBSERVATIONS ***

movestay (congbudchangetot2 l1congbudchangetot2  execbudchangetot2 bureauofbudget ebctot2baa lnagencyheadtenure  baalnaht  ebctot2lnaht  ebctot2baalnaht  ///
lnagencyage unifiedpartygovt presadminyear agenid9 agenid12 agenid22 agenid23 agenid27 agenid31 agenid33 agenid35) if agenid!=15, ///
cluster(agenid) select(regimetot = executiveagency) difficult
*
estat ic
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************



********** EVALUATING PROPOSITION 3 [WITHIN-REGIME MODEL RESTRICTION/COEFFICIENTS] **************************



** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS [SECTION 5: TOTAL DISCRETIONARY BUDGET MODEL: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS] **

*** PLEASE NOTE THAT ONLY AHT = 1, 6, & 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE ARE REPORTED BELOW TO MATCH THE ENTRIES IN TABLE SI-5C ****



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.1A: PRE-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907



*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.2A: POST-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 1: E <= A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_1]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 + [congbudchangetot2_1]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907
*
*
*

************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************


*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.1B: PRE-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759  == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER PRE-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907 




*** TABLE SI-5C COMPUTED STATISTICS: PART II.2B: POST-BAA REFORMS: PARTIAL AGENCY UNIT EFFECTS USING 'SUFFICIENT' AGENCY PANELS -- (REGIME 0: E > A)   ***

* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 0 == AHT = 1 YEAR OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 1.791759 == AHT = 6 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*1.791759  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*1.791759 
*
* CONDITIONAL MARGINAL EFFECT OF EBI UNDER POST-BAA REFORMS WHEN LN[AHT] = 2.484907  == AHT = 12 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE  *
lincom [congbudchangetot2_0]execbudchangetot2 + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baa + [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2lnaht*2.484907  ///
+ [congbudchangetot2_0]ebctot2baalnaht*2.484907 







 * SAVE "EXECUTIVE BUDGETARY INFLUENCE" DATABASE AFTER ANALYSES OF REPORTED MODELS *
 
save "C:\Users\gk57526\Dropbox\Informal & Formal Bargaining (BAA Reforms)\JOP Replication File Materials\Data\execbudinfluence.08-26-2020.SI SECTION 5.ALTERNATIVE AGENCY PANEL MODELS.comments.dta", replace




 * CLOSE LOG FILE

 log close
 